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Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) - understood as the formalised analytical 
activities initiated or carried out by central government administrations when 
designing specific policy instruments - is currently receiving high levels of po-
litical attention. It is seen as a tool to improve regulatory quality and to promote 
cross-cutting objectives such as sustainable development. Often conceived as an 
economic analysis of costs and benefits, RIA tends to be depicted as ‘neutral’ 
assessment process that informs decision makers about ‘facts’. This does not 
explain, of course, why RIA often becomes an arena for political conflict involv-
ing both government departments and stakeholders. Based on empirical re-
search on the design and practical application of RIA across the European Un-
ion, this paper explores the relationship between RIA, policy-making and poli-
tics. The aim is to shed light on what knowledge is produced, how it is used by 
different actors and what role it plays in decision-making. Based on this analy-
sis, we explore to what extent and under what conditions RIA can serve as a tool 




There are few institutional venues in which knowledge, politics, and policy-
making are more closely interlinked than in Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA). RIA is commonly understood as the formal appraisal activities initiated or 
coordinated by government administrations during the process of developing 
specific policy instruments. RIA can take different forms and is frequently made 
up of several procedures (e.g. competitiveness, environmental, health and ad-
ministrative burden assessments). RIA is currently receiving high levels of po-
litical attention, not only as a tool to improve regulatory quality and reduce 
regulatory burden, but also as an instrument to promote environmental policy 
integration and sustainable development. Many environment stakeholders have 
long demanded that major proposals in all areas of policy (transport, agriculture, 
energy and so on) should undergo an environmental appraisal. The objective of 
this appraisal would be to broaden the criteria used in policy design that have 
tended to focus narrowly on whether the policy can efficiently solve a given 
problem. It aims to ensure that adequate consideration is given to potential 
impacts on the environment and possible ways of avoiding or mitigating these 
effects. The introduction of RIA procedures - particularly the Impact Assess-
ment at the European Commission (COM(2002) 276 final) - was therefore met 
with high expectations by environmental NGOs. First experiences with the pro-
cedure, however, have led some environmental stakeholders to raise the concern 
that RIA promotes the sidelining of the environment rather than its main-
streaming (cf. Coffey, 2004). This raises the question to what extent and under 
what conditions RIA can serve as a tool for more integrated and sustainability-
oriented policy-making processes.  
RIA is a particularly fascinating case for the analysis of the role of knowledge in 
policy-making because it has quasi-scientific ambitions, but also takes place at 
the heart of government where political decisions are transformed into laws, 
regulations and other policy instruments. The paper analyses both the produc-
tion and the use of knowledge in the context of RIA with the aim of shedding 
more light on the different functions knowledge can play in policy processes. 
Using positivist and post-positivist conceptualisations of the role of knowledge 
in policy-making as the theoretical lens, it compares and contrasts how RIA is 
conceived in policy documents and how it functions in practice. The paper is 
based on an empirical research project analysing RIA procedures across the 
European Union.1 The paper begins by giving a brief account of ways in which 
                                              
1 The EVIA (Evaluating Integrated Impact Assessment) project was funded by the European 
Commission under the Sixth Franework Programme. It was coordinated by the Environ-
mental Policy Research Centre at the Freie Universität Berlin., research partners were the 
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the role of knowledge in policy-making is theorised. It then provides an analysis 
of how RIA procedures are conceived and set up in EU Member States and in the 
European Commission. The following part contrasts this with the practice of 
RIA drawing on in-depth studies in five selected jurisdictions. The final section 
explores whether and how RIA can serve as a procedure for more open, discur-
sive and cooperative policy-making processes if procedures are informed not by 
naive rationalist ideas, but more nuanced and realistic concepts of the produc-
tion and use of knowledge in decision making. 
Conceptualisations of the role of knowledge in policy-making 
RIA aims to enhance public policy-making by systematically integrating the 
stock of available knowledge into these processes. This goal brings into play the 
epistemological issue of the type of knowledge which is thought to enable the 
improvement of policy-making. A distinction of different types of policy-
relevant knowledge that is often put forward in literature is that between the 
technical-rationalist and the post-positivist orientation (Owens et al., 2004; see 
also Fay, 1975, Radin, 2000; Stone, 2002; Stirling, 2005). This section give a brief 
overview of the two orientations as both are important theoretical reference 
points for the analysis of the interface between knowledge and policy. The tech-
nical-rationalist orientation has been the dominant perspective on policy-
relevant knowledge, but in has in the last twenty years been criticized by the 
proponents of the post-postivist approach. This, so-called, 'argumentative turn' 
in policy science (Torgerson 1986, Fischer and Forrester 1993) has nowadays 
become part and parcel of policy sciences. Although the two perspectives differ 
fundamentally from an analytical point of view, both can provide a fruitful per-
spective for the study of policy-making. What is notable about the field of RIA is 
that it has been almost unaffected by insights from the post-positivist orienta-
tion. 
The technical-rational orientation has been authoritative since the 1950s, and 
builds upon a positivist epistemology in which scientific knowledge is objec-
tively validated by application of sound methodology. Scientific information is 
considered to be value-free and as such has no political content; the application 
of such knowledge enables the political debate to be 'liberated' from interest-
based and value-led knowledge claims. A defining characteristic of the technical-
rational model is its schematic representation of decision-making processes. 
Such a schematic approach is preferred over a messy and more naturalistic rep-
                                                                                                                                             
Institute for Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), The Institute for European En-
vironmental Policy (IEEP), AVANZI, the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (JRC-
IPTS), the Centre for Regulatory Governance at the University of Exeter and the Institute for 
Environmental Studies at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 
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resentation of the policy domain, because the assumption is that the 'rationality' 
of a process can be determined in relation to the way decisions would have been 
made in a 'perfect' world (Schreurs, 2000). 
Applied to the phenomenon of policy-making, the technical-rational model 
invokes decisions as the outcome of a process that can be analytically subdivided 
into logical steps. With that, a linear sequence of stages in the decision-making 
process emerges, each of those stages having its defining features. In its most 
condensed form, the sequence of policy steps is as follows: first, a policy goal has 
to be decided upon; second, a population of policy options with which this goal 
can be achieved has to be mapped out; third, out of this set of policy options, the 
most efficient measure is selected. 
One of the crucial elements of rationality is the intentionality with which deci-
sions are made. Every step in the decision entails that choices are deliberately 
made. Logically, this intentionality implies that there is someone or something 
that actually reasons. In other words, the technical-rational model invokes a 
unitary agent to whom decisions can be attributed.  
Even the most arduous technical-rationalist will admit that this scheme does 
not concur with empirical reality. There are necessary and contingent features 
that prevent the rational scheme from being effectuated into real life. Herbert 
Simon (1997) pointed to the fact that due to limitations in resources and human 
neurological capacities it is impossible to take the whole population of possible 
policy tools into account– we have to be content with 'bounded rationality' in 
that respect. Similar limitations to rationality also apply to collective actors 
which are often treated as individual agents (Pesch, 2005). 
The aspiration of the technical-rational policy analyst is to enhance the 'ration-
ality' of the policy process: the empirical reality is assessed against the ideal 
represented by the technical-rational template. Deviations from that template 
will be interpreted as less rational or even irrational.  
Advice can take place at several levels. A policy analyst can contrast empirical 
decision-making processes with the idealized representation and thus advise on 
how the process could be made 'more rational'. For instance, such an advice 
could concern claims about goals that have to be made explicit or more realistic, 
so that it becomes easier to identify means to achieve them. Policy analysts can 
also support decision-makers is by giving advice on instruments that are avail-
able to achieve the given objectives. A further approach is to provide analytical 
methodologies that enable actors to apply rational criteria to the choice between 
different alternatives. One may think here of ways of quantifying the costs and 
benefits associated with certain policy instrument. Following this perspective, 
policy analysis increases the rationality of decisions by allowing agencies com-
posed of several individuals to reach agreement about certain goals or certain 
policy tools. In other words, a plurality of voices is harmonized into one singular 
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voice. This harmonization process is first based upon the neutral and objective 
character of the knowledge produced by the policy analysis, and second upon 
the positivist assumption that reality can be described by a consistent and co-
herent knowledge basis. These two characteristics help unite political agents, 
who are divided with respect to their interests or value systems, by turning to a 
unified body of knowledge that is neutral and value-free.  
In contrast, the post-positivist orientation comprises a number of alternative 
approaches to the technical-rational model sketched above. Following Owens et 
al., (2004), we can distinguish three interrelated forms of challenges to the tech-
nical-rational model. A first form of critique argues that the technical-rational 
model is theoretically inadequate. This claim is predominantly based upon the 
way that a distinction between the realm of 'facts' and that of 'values'. The le-
gitimacy of this distinction has not only been heavily disputed from a social-
constructivist perspective, but even technical-rational policy analysts themselves 
do not live up to it: Their efforts to reframe political argument into technical 
terms in order to facilitate rational decision-making implies that value claims 
can indeed be translated into knowledge claims. 
A second form of critique holds that the technical-rational model is politically 
inadequate because it is seen to harbour the danger that prevailing structures of 
power, interest, and value are reinforced through the 'scientisation of politics' 
(Weingart, 1999, Hoppe, 2005). In its inability to acknowledge the core of poli-
tics, the technical-rational model fails to produce legitimate decisions. Instead 
of opening up decision-making processes to all groups of society - particularly 
social minorities, the technical-rational model facilitates 'closure' by implicitly 
excluding those groups (Stirling, 2005). The argument of political inadequacy 
can be extended to the claim that the technical-rational model is also practically 
inadequate. The exposure to shortcomings that are suggested by the claims that 
the technical-rational model is both theoretically and politically inadequate will 
almost inevitably lead to the loss of credibility of such analysis techniques and of 
the policies that result from them. 
Conceptualising a policy analysis that overcomes these inadequacies, post-
positivists have stressed the relativity of policy-relevant knowledge. Knowledge 
that can be used in policy is often not the kind of knowledge that can be pro-
duced by science (Ravetz, 1985; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979). Therefore, the strict 
criteria that are applied to create legitimate scientific claims cannot be main-
tained, which implies that policy-relevant knowledge can typically only have 
provisional value. In many cases, policy can only be based on knowledge that is 
surrounded by uncertainties and bounded by normative assumptions, which 
demands policy analysts to be very cautious in their advice. As the reliability of 
scientific information is questioned, other forms of knowledge gain status. In 
other words, the production of policy-relevant knowledge is pulled out of the 
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confinement of the scientific domain, and now it is seen as an endeavour which 
is intrinsic to the policy domain itself, developed by a myriad of public actors 
(Scharpf, 1997). 
In policy analysis, these insights have led to an emphasis the contextualized and 
linguistic nature of policy-relevant knowledge claims in the policy realm. In 
relation to the first aspect, following Rein and Schön (1991), policy problems are 
constructed through frames in which facts, values, theories and interests are 
integrated. Hence, the frame of a policy analyst may be of a different nature than 
that of citizen or a stakeholder. Using the notion of 'frames', the struggle for 
policy becomes a fight over the power to frame a policy problem (and therefore 
also policy solutions) in a certain way (cf. Majone, 1989). Experts are then not 
seen as 'guardians of the truth', but as political agents who try to enforce their 
discursive version of the truth upon the public sphere (cf. Foucault, 1996). Hajer 
(1994) shows how different 'discourse coalitions' may emerge to articulate an 
issue so that it facilitates a certain scientific and political approach. These in-
sights into the discursive nature of policy-formation suggest that the crucial task 
of policy analysts is to make these processes more democratic by developing 
participatory methods that facilitate the empowerment of groups and individu-
als who are usually excluded from participation (Dryzek, 2000). 
The post-positivist critique has not only shown that the role of knowledge in 
policy rarely corresponds to its designated role in the technical-rationalmodel, 
but has more fundamentally questioned the appropriateness of this model to 
serve as an ideal type on both functional and normative grounds. Nevertheless, 
the differences between technical-rational and post-postivist models of policy 
appraisal should not be overstated (e.g. Owens et al, 2004). This is firstly because 
elements of both the models are typically combined in theory and practice. A 
second reason is that the role and function of policy analysis heavily depends on 
the context, particularly the nature of the policy issue at stake. By far not all 
policy issues involve matters that have high societal stakes and a large degree of 
scientific complexity. In those instances, a technical-rational approach is prefer-
able, as post-positivist approaches generally require more resources and do not 
necessarily guarantee a satisfactory result (Ravetz, 1985; Hisschemöller and 
Hoppe, 2001). 
We would, however, maintain the distinction between the two models for ana-
lytical purposes, as it enables us to recognize tacit inclinations and implicit as-
sumptions in certain practices in policy analysis, and determine possible short-
comings in the light of the theoretical arguments presented above. Analysing the 
theory and practice of RIA through the lens of these two theoretical perspectives, 
we will show that in general the concept of RIA is presented almost fully in line 
with the technical-rational model of policy analysis. However, an analysis of 
concrete policy proposals highlights that practice does not conform with the 
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model, but that it confirms its empirical inadequacy. This leads us to consider 
ways in which RIA-procedures could take more account of post-positivist, i.e. 
more realistic as well as normatively grounded ideas. 
2 The conceptualisation of RIA in policy documents 
RIA is commonly understood as a set of formal analytical activities initiated and 
coordinated by government administrations in the process of designing specific 
policies. The OECD defines Impact Assessment as “information-based analytical 
approach to assess probable costs, consequences, and side effects of planned 
policy instruments (laws, regulations, etc.).” (OECD 2001, p. 10). The large major-
ity of OECD countries have one or several formal RIA procedures in place (Jacob 
et al., 2007, Radaelli, 2005), although they vary with regard to their institutional 
arrangements, specific orientations and implementation. The aims of RIA are 
described in different terms, but a common objective is to improve decision 
making processes by systematically collecting information about the likely im-
pacts of a planned policy and thereby providing the basis deciding on the ‘best’ 
policy. In many countries, RIA is strongly related to a 'better regulation' agenda 
that aims to improve the quality of regulation, reduce administrative burden 
and make a positive contribution to economic competitiveness. Recently, in 
many countries the scope has been broadened and requirements to assess dif-
ferent dimensions of sustainable development have been added as additional 
aspects.  
In this section, we analyse how RIA procedures are conceived and set up, par-
ticularly with regard to how RIA knowledge is supposed to be produced and 
used in the policy process. It draws on an extensive review of European RIA 
procedures. Individual country studies were carried out for all 27 Member 
States2 and for the European Union. Data sources are the respective national 
guidelines, related policy documents, OECD reports, evaluation reports, aca-
demic literature, and selected telephone interviews with officers in coordinating 
units. The results were written up in the form of country reports that describe 
the design of the RIA system (legal framework, rationale for introduction, cover-
age, institutional set up etc.) as well as its operation in practice (number of as-
sessments carried out, timing, quality and scope of analysis, stakeholder in-
volvement, analytical methods, publication of results etc.). The presentation of 
the empirical material in the following section is structured around the key 
formal elements of RIA procedures: the objectives, the design of the process, the 
timing, the audience, involved actors and preferred methodologies. 
                                              
2  Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Luxemburg and Malta do not have a RIA system in place and 
have therefore not been studied in detail. 
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The stated objectives of RIA 
Surprisingly, the policy documents underlying RIA procedures in the different 
EU countries often do not state an explicit objective. It appears to be taken for 
granted that better information straightforwardly leads to 'better' decisions, 
while a normative dimension is not perceived. Such an assumed value free con-
cept indicates a prevalence of the rationalist concept. Where an aim is stated, 
reducing costs imposed by regulation is the most frequently cited objective (e.g. 
Denmark, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK). A 
smaller number of countries also mention the improvement of competitiveness 
as an important goal of RIA. The assumption typically made is that reducing 
regulatory and administrative burden can be achieved without compromising 
policy objectives. Fostering sustainable development is an explicitly mentioned 
goal only in the Netherlands and the European Commission. Broadly, the con-
cept of RIA follows a rationalist idea: The assessment is perceived as a value-free 
effort, objectives are provided either by the policy itself or they are lying outside 
the scope of RIA. It is meant to inform decision makers who are separate from 
those involved in the assessment process. We did not find much evidence of 
alternative epistemological approaches. For example, RIA procedures tend not to 
place any emphasis on discursive objectives, for example developing shared 
interpretations of policy problems or building a broader consensus on an ac-
ceptable distribution of costs.  
The RIA process 
RIA procedures are typically set out as a linear process with sequence of analyti-
cal steps that mirror the phases of problem-solving. It normally begins with the 
identification of a policy problem or objective by the rule making unit, runs 
through an analysis of options and respective impacts which leads to a weighing 
up of alternatives with a final selection of the 'best' policy choice (see for exam-
ple OECD, 1997 and CEC, 2005). This linear process which assumes a political 
will or objective that may be somewhat refined during the RIA, but which in 
general is exogenously given. It does not explicitly give room for or make refer-
ence to processes of negotiating and bargaining to identify compromises that 
are acceptable for a political majority. Instead, the assessment is designed on the 
basis of the assumption that there is one most efficient way of achieving the 
given objectives. This conception of RIA is, at least implicitly, based on a num-
ber of assumptions: that policies are designed to address well-defined problems 
or objectives, that impacts of planned policies can be anticipated with a certain 
degree of accuracy, that different types of impacts can be weighed up against 
each other and that the a final choice can be reached on the basis of the analysis. 
It is not uncommon that procedures use concepts and terminology stemming 
from an economic methodology - for example 'expected net benefit' or 'cost-
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benefit-ratio'. In many countries, the guidelines acknowledge that proposals 
change during policy formulation and that the RIA process should in principle 
be iterative. While the process is staged in some countries, only a few systems 
systematically linked this to the political process. Only a few jurisdictions (e.g. 
UK) explicitly foresee an evaluation step, thereby conceiving it as a cyclical 
rather than a linear process. The RIA process is typically designed to end with a 
policy recommendation or decision. In a number of jurisdictions, guidance 
documents that set out the RIA process in detail are missing altogether, suggest-
ing either a lack of awareness of process issues or a generally low priority of the 
procedure.  
Timing and audience 
The foreseen timing of RIA varies considerably between jurisdictions. Several 
jurisdictions require that RIA should begin 'at an early stage', i.e. as soon as a 
policy measure is considered (Czech Republic, European Commission, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Poland, UK). Others foresee the assessment once a proposal 
has been drafted (Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia). In general, requirements 
regarding the timing are not very specific. The audience of the assessment is not 
always made explicit either, but can usually be derived from approach, the tim-
ing and the level of transparency. In jurisdictions where RIA reports either do 
not exist (i.e. the gathered knowledge is not put together into a formal docu-
ment) or are not systematically published, the main audience are government 
officials themselves and their hierarchy. In most countries, a summary of the 
results of the RIA is made public, often only as part of a short explanatory 
memorandum (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). Where RIA summaries are submitted to parliament, 
an important function of RIA is seen as providing parliamentarians with the 
information necessary to make a political decision on the proposed regulation. 
Stakeholders (and, to a lesser extent, citizens) are seen as an important audience 
only in jurisdictions where RIA reports are systematically published (e.g. UK, 
Ireland, EU). The dominant view appears to be that RIA is a purely analytical 
task that is (and should be) separated from the political sphere. Bureaucrats that 
are assumed to be neutral and to base their decisions on the best available in-
formation. There are few examples of guidelines that make explicit reference to 
the relationship between RIA and administrative and political hierarchy. Implic-
itly, the dominant assumption is that RIA knowledge can play the role of 
'enlightening' the political leadership. 
Involvement of political institutions 
RIA is in all jurisdictions mainly a duty of the administrative unit responsible 
for the drafting of the proposal. The lead policy unit is perceived as the actor 
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with both the competence and responsibility required to conduct an assessment 
and to adjust the proposal accordingly. There is little involvement of other po-
litical institutions, for example the parliament or representations of regions or 
localities. The EU is the only jurisdiction which has adopted an inter-
institutional regulation on RIA procedures. On the other hand, it is notable that 
no RIA procedure makes provisions to systematically outsource the assessment 
to external consultants or agencies (except for administrative burden assess-
ments). This indicates that there is a certain acknowledgement that RIA is not a 
purely scientific process. We did not find any examples of Member States that 
require RIA for proposals or significant amendments by parliament. The Swed-
ish and Finnish Committee procedures3 can be seen as an interesting exception. 
These committees are made up of members of parliament, civil society and 
government. In some countries where the parliament is charged with overseeing 
the process, RIA procedures have been reviewed by a parliamentary committee 
(e.g. UK). A common model is that RIA results become part of an Explanatory 
Memorandum that accompanies that proposal when it is tabled in parliament. 
In general, the prevailing view is that RIA is largely an internal administrative 
process that does not require the active involvement of other institutions. 
Involvement of external stakeholders 
In most of the studied jurisdictions, RIA procedures do not foresee an active 
involvement of external stakeholders. The role of actors such as interest groups, 
NGOs, and local authorities is to comment on the substance of the proposal 
through routine consultation procedures such as hearings and written consulta-
tion. Many jurisdictions see stakeholders are an audience of RIA to be informed 
about the outcome of the assessment (see 'timing and audience'). Exceptions are 
the EU, Ireland, the Czech Republic and the UK, where policy documents em-
phasise that consultation should be an integral part of the assessment process 
because stakeholders hold relevant knowledge and because involvement can 
increase public buy-in (see for example UK Cabinet Office, 2007 and CEC, 2005). 
Consequently, the foreseen external involvement varies considerably across EU 
member states. Three main models of participation can be identified: stake-
holders are given the role of providing or validating factual information, they 
should be informed ex post about the assessment through an RIA statement, or 
they do not have any involvement. There was no case where participation is 
foreseen in the phase of designing the assessment. 
                                              
3  Finland has formally abandoned the Committee RIA procedure, but still practices it in some 
instances.  
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Role of coordinating units  
In all jurisdictions, RIA processes are managed and performed decentrally by 
individual departments. Central coordinating units are mostly either not men-
tioned at all or are foreseen in a role of support rather than enforcement. Nota-
ble exceptions are Poland and UK where Prime Minister's offices play the role of 
monitoring the quality of individual assessments, and the European Commis-
sion which has recently introduced an influential Impact Assessment Board 
made up of high-level officials. Specialised departments that support or oversee 
the assessments of other ministries can be found in a number of countries, most 
often the ministry of justice (e.g. Estonia, Finland, Hungary), finance (e.g. Slova-
kia), the interior (e.g. Germany) or economic affairs (e.g. Poland). Few countries 
have set up interdepartmental units that share the responsibility for the process, 
e.g. in the Netherlands, with the ministries of Justice, Environment and Econ-
omy responsible for the RIA.  There were no cases where a ministry of the envi-
ronment or social affairs is given the main responsibility. 
Interdepartmental cooperation 
The majority of jurisdictions have not established any formal mechanisms for 
interdepartmental cooperation in the process of RIA. Overall, there seems to be 
an assumptions that the lead policy unit has access to all relevant expertise or 
that routine consultation and negotiation processes can fulfil the function of 
knowledge transfer between ministries. For those countries that formally re-
quire the coordination between the ministries, two models can be distinguished. 
A number of countries have formalised procedures for the circulation of RIA 
reports or summaries (e.g. Germany, Ireland, Poland, UK). In Germany, depart-
ments are entitled to insist on the assessment of a specific impact. The second 
model is the establishment of interdepartmental working groups which work 
together on framing and conducting the assessment. This is, however, only fore-
seen in few jurisdictions (Czech Republic, EU, and in the Swedish and Finnish 
Committee system), sometimes only under certain circumstances.  
Role of analytical methodologies 
There are only two types of methodologies that are commonly mentioned in 
RIA-related policy documents: cost-benefit analysis (including variants such as 
cost-effectiveness analysis) and administrative burdens assessment (mainly us-
ing the Standard Cost Model). A number of countries favour economic analysis 
as the main framework of analysis (France, the Czech Republic, Italy, UK, Ger-
many and Finland). Only a few jurisdictions mention other quantitative and 
qualitative methods such as multi-criteria analysis and risk analysis (most nota-
bly the EU, but also Hungary, Poland and Ireland). Simple checklist tools are 
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also recommended in the UK, Netherlands and Portugal. Overall, the proposed 
methods focus on specific issues rather than providing incentives to analyse and 
weigh-up a broad range of potential impacts including side effects. More open, 
exploratory methods (e.g. scenario analysis) and those geared towards capturing 
uncertainties (e.g. sensitivity analysis) are also not covered. The selection of 
methodologies by jurisdictional guidelines confirms the focus of RIA on pro-
ducing 'hard', decision-guiding information in line with a positivist epistemol-
ogy. The suggested methods are clearly not geared towards objectives that would 
be considered important from the perspective of a post-positivist epistemology, 
for example clarifying or validating assumptions, searching appropriate prob-
lem framings, and analysing dominant and alternative discourses. 
Conclusion: RIA as a neutral, expert-based 'fact-finding' 
In summary, the analysis shows that policy documents conceive RIA mainly as 
an expert based, neutral fact-finding process to help officers develop a balanced 
proposal based on rational reasoning. It is performed by the administrative unit, 
in most countries without formal requirements to include other actors or politi-
cal institutions. In its ideal form it is meant to be free of normative choices, 
which are left to parliament and cabinet. It seems - at least implicitly - to be 
based on the idea that there is a unitary decision maker who should be informed 
through a quasi-scientific assessment. The missing attention to process issues 
may partly be attributed to a general lack of effort in designing effective assess-
ment procedures, but also reflects that the relationship between knowledge and 
policy is seen as straightforward. With a few exceptions, the conception of RIA 
draws heavily on a positivist epistemology. RIA procedures still follow a model 
of 'speaking truth to power'. They are - at least in the way they are set out on 
paper - almost unaffected by the 'postpositivist turn in policy analysis' (Hoppe, 
1999). In the subsequent section we will investigate to what extent RIA practice 
conforms to this view of the relationship between knowledge and policy. 
3 The practice of RIA at the interface between 
knowledge and politics 
While our analysis of RIA procedures in all 27 EU Member States (as reported in 
the previous section) was largely based on an evaluation of existing literature, 
the study of RIA practice in this section is based on primary research: Four re-
search teams carried out 22 in-depth policy case studies in five different juris-
dictions (Denmark, EU, Netherlands, Poland and UK, see table 1). The five na-
tional RIA systems were selected because of their fairly extensive experience with 
policy assessment, while at the same time representing a variety of different 
approaches of RIA as well as different political systems. The individual policy 
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cases in each jurisdiction were chosen to represent different policy areas and 
instruments, but all covered policy initiatives of a certain political and economic 
significance. Each case study involved extensive desk research, an interview with 
the responsible desk officer in the lead ministry and in many cases additional 
interviews with other involved ministries and stakeholders. As the case study 
research proved to be resource intensive and time consuming, fewer studies 
were carried out in countries where it was difficult to get access to government 
officials and RIA documents. Two case studies in Poland and the Netherlands 
had to be abandoned because with the responsible desk officers - who had ini-
tially signalled willingness to cooperate - were ultimately not available for inter-
views. 
Table 1: Overview of case studies 
Jurisdiction Policy area Lead Ministry 
Railways Interoperability Regulation Transport 
Disability discrimination regulation (transport) Transport 
Operating and financial review  Trade and Industry
Raising Credit Union interest rate cap Finance 
United  
Kingdom 
Work and families strategy Trade and Industry
Electronic waste (WEEE) Economic Affairs 
Nox Reduction Environment 
Denmark 
Maternity scheme Economic Affairs 
Kyoto Linking Directive Environment 
Financial services act Finance 
Integrated Water Act Transport 
Netherlands 
Agri-Environment Management Regulation Environment 
Innovation Act Economic Affairs Poland 
Organic farming policy Agriculture 
Working Time Directive Employment 
Registration and authorisation of chemicals (REACH) Environment 
Biomass Action Plan Transport 
Reform of sugar market Agriculture 
Accidents in maritime transport Transport 
Groundwater protection Environment 
Batteries and accumulators Environment 
European 
Union 
Visa Information System Justice 
The most striking observation when analysing the practice of RIA is the large 
variability of process and outcome, not just between but also within jurisdic-
tions. The variability concerns the process, the timing, the type and quality of 
knowledge produced, and the function of the knowledge in the policy process: 
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We found superficial RIAs done after all major decisions were taken, with the 
only objective of complying with an administrative procedure. On the other 
hand, we also found - sometimes in the same country - excellent pieces of analy-
sis carried out in parallel with the policy development process, analysing rigor-
ously the major intended and unintended effects of different options which led 
to considerable instrumental learning on policy design. While a certain hetero-
geneity in terms of process, quality and impact may be expected, we surprisingly 
found that the relationship between those variables is also far from consistent: 
Some of the studied RIA reports were well-written and rigorously researched but 
interviews showed that they served the function of justifying a previously taken 
decision and have very little impact on the decision (except, perhaps, in the 
sense of creating political support for the preferred policy option). In another 
case we found that a fairly simple RIA that was narrowly focused on administra-
tive costs turned out to be influential in changing the design of the policy. 
What is also clearly visible from the 22 case studies is that conformity of RIA 
practice with the process described by jurisdictional guidance documents is the 
exception rather than the norm. The divergence between guidance and practice 
can be described and analysed in different ways. The mainstream literature on 
RIA normally focuses on barriers to more effective assessment and provides 
advice on processes, institutions, incentives and resources that could improve 
compliance. In the context of this paper we want to take a different approach 
and describe RIA practice in relation to the key assumptions of the instrumen-
tal-rational RIA model analysed in the previous section. We summarise them in 
relation to five 'illusions of rational policy analysis'.  
The illusion of linearity 
While guidance documents tend to describe RIA in terms of a rational problem-
solving process, the reality observed in practice often corresponds to a process 
in which the objectives and problems are continuously reframed and re-
interpreted. Policy development often takes place under constraints which leave 
little room for manoeuvre due to the need to find consensus and political sup-
port. Accordingly, policy change is largely path dependent and incremental. 
There were few cases where a more fundamental policy change was a realistic 
possibility and for which the lead ministry seriously considered fundamentally 
different policy options. In many of the studied cases, policy discussions and 
negotiations evolved around a solution (or policy measure) rather than a prob-
lem. Thereby, policy making resembled more the ‘garbage can model’ of policy 
making (Cohen et al., 1972) or the multiple stream model (Kingdon, 1984). In 
some cases, the policy process originated neither from a problem nor from a 
solution, but from a decision opportunity. This was, for example, the case when 
a newly appointed minister took the opportunity to raise her profile by an-
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nouncing a new policy initiative. Even where one can speak of a policy problem 
that prompted a certain measure, those often took the form of administrative or 
legal requirements created by the politico-administrative system itself - often at 
a higher governance level. This concerns for example the need to implement 
European legislation or to operationalise overarching laws through more de-
tailed regulations. Desk officers feel at times obliged to describe a fictitious 
process of problem definition and options appraisal which has not taken place 
and would not have been realistic to expect. The idea that better knowledge 
leads straightforwardly to better policy designs is also not usually borne out in 
practice. Although RIA produced in some cases robust and useful insights that 
were taken into account in policy formulation (especially in the EU), in other 
cases the analysis only played a marginal role due to conflicting political com-
mitments. In some cases a very elaborated analysis turned out to be completely 
irrelevant for practical decision making. And even if the knowledge gathered in 
the RIA process is taken up in the political decision making, its function is not 
obvious: As observed previously by many other authors (e.g. Weiss, 1999, Hertin 
et al., 2007), learning is only one possible use of knowledge. Other functions 
include political or strategic use (i.e. to justify or undermine a particular policy), 
symbolic use (i.e. to delay decisions) and non-use. 
The illusion of 'neutral' and 'objective' analysis 
The expectation that RIA provides a reliable, objective and comprehensive pic-
ture of potential impacts of a planned policy is clearly not realistic. The holistic 
approach - as formulated in many guidelines - to assess all intended and unin-
tended effects and side effects is far beyond the possibilities of RIA in practice. 
Almost all cases showed that analysis of potential future impacts is necessarily 
uncertain, incomplete, simplified and potentially contested. The only exceptions 
were very small or procedural measures the implications of which can be deter-
mined with a certain accuracy. The reasons for this related to many different 
factors at different levels. There are obvious methodological difficulties (e.g. in 
adequately describing temporally and spatially differentiated environmental 
impact) and data shortages (e.g. due to commercial confidentiality), more fun-
damental limitations of knowledge (e.g. about future socio-economic condi-
tions), problems of human agency and reflexivity (e.g. in the behaviour of public 
agencies or target groups) and irresolvable normative disputes about the valua-
tion of different types of impacts (e.g. trade-offs between economic, social and 
environmental effects). Several interviewees - especially in the UK and the EU - 
also pointed out the tension between comprehensiveness and policy impact, 
emphasising that in their experience neither stakeholders nor politicians have 
the time to engage with long, technical RIA reports. Particular difficulties were 
associated with the assessment of the benefits of policies. Even a brief reflection 
on studied policies makes it clear that it is difficult to accurately measure their 
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positive effects. What, for example, is exactly the benefit of increased social and 
environmental reporting by companies, extended parental leave, lower agricul-
tural subsidies, better groundwater protection, an extension of organic farming 
or more transparent financial services. RIAs were not just uncertain and incom-
plete, but it was also apparent that they inevitably adopt a selective analytical 
framing. This partly appeared to be a strategy to reduce complexity: Given the 
wide range of different effects and the uncertainties associated with them, those 
in charge of the RIA tended to withdraw into the corner of their own area of 
expertise (i.e. the intended policy objectives) and that of partial methods that 
produce unambiguous figures, (e.g. on costs). Short-term economic costs are 
better represented than benefits because they tend to be raised by well-
organised and well-resourced stakeholder groups. Still, we found cases in which 
the assessment contributed to an increased transparency in weighting costs and 
benefits. It seems plausible that this made it more difficult to represent private 
or sectoral interests at the expense of public interests, although this is a claim 
that is difficult to confirm empirically. Overall, however, unintended effects and 
distributional implications were typically not given much attention. While the 
framing of the analysis was often coherent and thought through, it also seemed 
clear that alternative framings could be envisaged, for example with regard to 
problem definition, policy options, types of impacts, methods and timescales. In 
some cases this was illustrated by competing approaches by stakeholders and 
government departments opposing the measure. Given that RIA knowledge is 
often used strategically by different actors to promote a specific political posi-
tion, it does not surprise that political considerations also play a role also in the 
set-up of the analysis. Several desk officers confirmed the impression one can 
have from reading RIA reports: that information is commonly filtered and pre-
sented in way that it supports and justifies the preferred policy option.  
The illusion of a unitary decision-maker 
The idea of a unitary decision-maker seems implicit in many RIA-related policy 
documents. In practice, however, this model of a neutral, objective government 
department that chooses the most efficient policy option based on the RIA is 
naive. In a pluralistic political system, decisions are not made by a single actor. 
Instead, different political parties, interest groups, ministries, sometimes indi-
vidual politicians or bureaucrats take part in a competitive process of policy 
shaping. All of those actors will at times make statements of policy impacts to 
legitimise their proposed course of action. We encountered many instances 
where RIA knowledge played a role in these political negotiation processes, al-
though the role was often fairly small. The main interest of the lead department 
was in several of the cases to develop a proposal that is positively perceived by 
the public. RIA then became an instrument to strategically argue the case for the 
proposal, for example by presenting the positive effects of the policy while not 
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exploring possible costs and negative impacts. In some cases, information con-
tainted in RIAs were used by government departments, opposition parties, tar-
get groups or other stakeholders to oppose a proposed measure, typically on 
grounds of administrative or economic cost. In one UK case, the same cost data 
put forward by the economics department to justify the policy was used by the 
finance ministry to argue for the withdrawal of the policy. There have been a few 
cases, however, where RIA has played a more positive role as forum in which 
actors with conflicting interests have engaged in a transparent, evidence-based 
debate about the consequences of policies.  
The illusion of analytical 'closure' 
While many guidance documents favour quantitative and economic approaches, 
desk officers were typically unable to provide any formal analysis except narrow 
assessments of administrative burdens on companies and simple cost calcula-
tions (with the exception of large EU policy reforms that drew on extensive stud-
ies). In theory, RIA is supposed to guide decisions by providing a reliable picture 
of positive and negative impacts of the policy, i.e. it aims to help 'close down' 
(Stirling, 2005) decision processes. In practice, however, this was only achieved in 
relation to the more 'technical' RIAs carried out on very specific policies (e.g. 
different implementation options for an EU Directive). In more complex cases, 
RIAs tended to show that policies have a wide range of consequences - some 
desired, some undesired, some uncertain - which cannot easily be weighed up 
against each other, not least because of fundamental problems of incom-
mensurability. While RIA has shown to produce relevant knowledge, it does not 
in itself lead to analytical closure in the sense of producing a 'best' policy option. 
Interviewees confirmed that this his is often at odds with the expectations of 
policy-makers. Unless a minister or senior official happens to be very involved 
in a particular issue, she or she tends to expect clear and concise recommenda-
tions for a favoured course of action rather than qualified, complex information 
reflecting on different options and impacts. Officials therefore tend to downplay 
potential risks and leave out alternative options - at least when the proposal is 
made public or enters political negotiations. This has in some cases lead to a 
form of 'artificial closure' based on the legitimacy of an assessment rather than 
on the substance of the analysis which was framed in ways that were not shared 
by all stakeholders. While lack of closure or artificial closure were the most 
common scenarios, we also analysed one case where the specific circumstances 
allowed the RIA process to support a participatory search for consensual, effi-
cient measures to address a recognised problem. 
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The illusion that relevant knowledge is exclusively held by 
experts 
In most jurisdictions, RIA is conceived as a largely internal process based on the 
expertise of public administration. Government officials, particularly the lead 
policy unit, are expected to have access to the knowledge required to assess the 
impacts of new policies, in some cases with the assistance of external studies or 
sectoral agencies. It is evident that specialised government officials normally 
have great - in some cases unrivalled - knowledge of a policy area. There can also 
be no doubt that ex ante policy appraisal requires specialised technical expertise. 
However, the experience in jurisdictions that give stakeholders a more promi-
nent role in RIA (especially the EU, to some extent also the UK and Scandinavian 
countries) shows that the knowledge of practitioners is also very important. In 
case studies that drew extensively on knowledge (and judgement) by industry, 
NGOs and other stakeholders and professionals, interviewees emphasised that 
their input was vital in becoming aware of unintended consequences, determin-
ing the magnitude of effects, reaching a balanced assessment, and developing 
norms and procedures that can be implemented in practice. 
4 Conclusion: Towards RIA as a discursively rational 
process 
In the previous section we have shown that RIA as it operates in practice shows 
little resemblance to the linear and instrumentally-rational process of gathering 
neutral facts for better policies that it typically held up as the ideal-typical model 
in policy documents. What, however, are the implications of this finding? One 
might argue that this observation does not in itself discredit the instrumental-
rational model as an aspiration, nor does it provide an alternative to it. Taking 
each of these arguments in turn, the first question is whether the positivist ori-
entation of RIA procedures is a barrier to their functioning as an effective aid to 
integrated and sustainable policy-making. A key reason for the weakness of for-
mal policy assessment seemed to be that key actors do not have an interest in or 
experiences with transparent assessment practices. Politicians tend to see policy 
assessment as restricting their discretion as ministers or parliamentarians and 
focus on defending the suggested measure from fairly early stages. Policy-
makers in ministries tend to see it as counterproductive to their effort to push a 
legislative proposal through the legislative process. Major stakeholder groups 
with access to ministries also tend to benefit from traditional corporatist styles 
of consultation and tend not to press for transparency. Given these fundamental 
barriers, any formal policy assessment system would face resistance, but the 
research suggest that the rationalist approach of the current procedure adds 
specific problems. Three main problem areas can be identified.  
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First, we have observed a widespread lack of commitment and resources to RIA. 
While few actors have expressed the view that RIA is wholly unnecessary, it is 
often seen as a 'side event' of the political process. Actors involved in the produc-
tion and use of RIA knowledge - desk officers, senior officials, politicians, stake-
holders - have expressed different views on why the impact of RIA on decisions 
is limited, but overall the research suggests that the large gap between the pre-
scribed linear RIA formats and the practice of political decision-making plays an 
important role. If assessment processes are seen rather separate from policy 
formulation, important actors will not devote substantial resources to carrying 
out a thorough analysis, discussing implications or drawing conclusions about 
desirable courses of action. This phenomenon was clearly apparent from many 
interviews with both government officials and non-state actors, and it appears to 
be self-reinforcing. 
Second, we would argue that the instrumentally-rational approach leads to a 
problematic bias in the selection of analytical methods. The focus of RIA meth-
odology on prediction and precision tends to narrows down the scope of the 
assessment as is carries with it a dominance of economic valuation and other 
quantitative methods. While this often increases the depth of the assessments, 
the trade-offs in relation to the breadth of impact areas is not sufficiently ac-
knowledged. Qualitative knowledge tend to be undervalued and few attempts are 
made to capture uncertainties or explore sensitivities in relation to methods and 
assumptions. The case studies have illustrated a strong reluctance to apply 
structured ways of analysing qualitative information and to introduce methodo-
logical approaches that open up decision processes to public scrutiny. Third, the 
presumed simple relationship between knowledge and policy appears to a lack 
of attention to process issues. This concerns, in particular, the widespread as-
sumption that the lead policy unit has - or can easily acquire, the required 
knowledge. As RIA procedures tend to make little effort to involve different 
types of expertise target groups, other affected stakeholders, and implementing 
bodies, they miss the opportunity to gather knowledge for the robust design of 
workable and acceptable policies. The rational model also draws the attention of 
evaluators inside and outside government to the 'technical' elements of the as-
sessment (for example the number of options studied, the degree of quantifica-
tion and so on) to the detriment of a more appropriate focus on learning proc-
esses.  
The question of an alternative orientation of RIA is more difficult to answer, as 
the post-positivist perspective is arguably better at pointing to the weaknesses of 
traditional assessment approaches than at providing operational alternatives. 
We would not argue that instrumental learning has no role to play in RIA and 
that conventional methods of policy analysis should be completely replaced. 
Policy formulation raises different types of questions and many of them can be 
adequately treated through traditional forms of rational analysis. Policy analysis 
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may provide such approaches, even though they are reductionist and their rele-
vance can only be provisional. The strong points of the post-positivist analysis 
lies in making us aware of even those provisional qualities and of the risks asso-
ciated with the non-reflective use of scientific knowledge in the policy domain. 
By identifying the limits of rationalists approaches, by reframing the expecta-
tions of the potentials of RIA from this perspective, assessments can be made 
more robust and more relevant to the policy process. The potentials of the dis-
cursive and political functions of RIA are currently underutilised. As develop-
ments in other fields of assessment - particularly risk assessment, technology 
assessment and environmental assessment have shown how traditional method-
ologies and processes can be adjusted to increase not only the legitimacy, but 
also the robustness of analysis.  
In the area of RIA, the example of the European Commission's Impact Assess-
ment procedure has shown how the rational approach can be significantly quali-
fied and attenuated without compromising the basic goal of improving the evi-
dence base of policy-making (see also Hertin et al., 2007). Most importantly, RIA 
requirements, documents and institutions could more explicitly acknowledge 
the complex interrelationships and fuzzy boundaries between assessment activi-
ties and the political process. RIA practice is an activity where knowledge and 
politics are inextricably linked, and which combines evidence, logic, norms, 
judgement and rhetoric in a certain policy space. Therefore, neither policy 
documents nor those involved in the analysis should expect RIA to produce a 
single best choice. The aims of the assessment can be put more modestly, as for 
example in the Commission's guidelines: "This may then allow the conclusion 
to be drawn that one option stands out above the others. However, it is impor-
tant to reiterate that the final decision on whether, and how, to proceed is a 
political one" (CEC(2005) 791, p. 39). On the other hand, if the primacy of the 
political decision is over-emphasised, RIA will be limited to a narrow adjust-
ment of policy design or an exercise in ex post justification. It is hence necessary 
to reflect on a case-by-case basis about appropriate role of the assessment in the 
given political, legal and administrative context. RIA procedures should give 
lead ministries the flexibility to adapt the approach to the political and technical 
requirements of the specific case. In some cases, RIA can and should reflect on a 
broad set of potential measures, in others it can realistically do little more than 
fine-tune a proposal on which there is political consensus. 
Acknowledging that knowledge is not value-free does not imply, however, that 
every kind of political use of knowledge is legitimate or that RIA is indistin-
guishable from politics. But if RIA is to contribute to better use of evidence and 
more sustainability-oriented decision-making, it should not attempt to isolate 
itself from politics. Instead, RIA needs to engage with the political process and 
normative choices in a constructive way. This is partly a matter of framing the 
analysis appropriately, particularly by defining both technically and politically 
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appropriate assessment questions. Better integration between RIA and policy-
making can also be achieved through institutional changes. RIA should not re-
main at the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy, but need to receive at-
tention from the political leadership, for example through a ministerial signa-
ture for RIA reports or the involvement of parliament. This would require in 
many jurisdictions that the RIA process has to become far more transparent to 
external stakeholders. This would be a challenge particularly for countries with a 
more corporatist or closed culture of decision-making, but EU example shows 
that public scrutiny can be achieved and does not necessarily risk turning RIA 
into an exercise that just serves political legitimisation purposes. The inter-
ministerial steering groups and influential review bodies can provide a certain 
guard against the instrumentalisation of RIA for interest-based bargaining. 
Recognising the limits of instrumental rationality also implies that officials, 
policy-makers and stakeholders do not see the use of sophisticated assessment 
tools as the key to clearer recommendations. Although further investment in 
methodologies and data can be useful, it should be seen as a step towards more 
transparency and a better understanding of the normative choices. Overall, more 
attention should be given to systematic ways of analysing different qualitative 
and distributional impacts. These should aim to broaden the analysis, to con-
nect and compare different impacts without the over-ambitious objective to 
integrate all aspects into a single methodological framework. There is a wide 
range of multi-criteria assessment approaches the application of which could be 
promoted through guidance documents, best practice sharing and training 
courses. If RIA is to be developed towards a more discursive practice, reflection 
on methodology has to be seen as an important step in the scoping of the as-
sessment. It should not just be seen as a purely technical matter, but needs to be 
discussed with key actors (in particular relevant ministries and stakeholders). In 
important and controversial policy cases, it might be necessary to involve inter-
ested parties in the detailed design of the approach to ensure that the results are 
widely accepted. Given the current difficulties of RIA procedures in many coun-
tries to achieve even a fairly basic level of implementation and policy impact, 
such a more discursive orientation could not only achieve a higher level of le-
gitimacy and accountability, but it also seems a prerequisite to improving their 
relevance and, ultimately, effectiveness. 
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